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Changes in Post-Marital 
Residence Rules in an Era of 
National Reform: The Urban to 
Rural Disjunction in 
Contemporary China 
Michaela S. Clemens 
Abstract: Alternatives to the traditional practice of patrilocal post-
marital residence exist in modern day China and vary from urban to 
rural areas. Social and economic reforms that were instituted in post-
Mao China had an influence on post-marital residence rules. These 
refonns include marriage laws, reproduction restrictions, the return to 
family fanns, and greater access to employment. Government refonns 
had different impacts on urban and rural families, creating different 
family structures and compositions. Family customs, like post-marital 
residence, also diverged along rural and urban lines. In rural areas, 
patrilocality persists, but matrilocal marriage arrangements are 
increasing. In urban areas, a strong preference for neolocality is 
evident. There are also indications that patrilocal and matrilocal 
residence arrangements are becoming short-tenn transitions to 
neolocal residence. Using a collection of post-Mao literature, this 
paper examines the relationship between government policies and 
changes in urban and rural post-marital residence rules in 
contemporary China. 
Introduction 
Political and cultural transformations in China over the last 
century have revolutionized the basic unit of Chinese society - the 
family. What was once the archetype of strength and stability, the 
complex, patriarchal family of traditional China was deconstructed and 
re-formed under modem rule. Changes in family practices and customs 
followed. In this environment of social and economic change, modem 
Chinese families made new choices in post-marital residence practices. 
Different impacts of national policies on rural and urban families 
created two distinct patterns for residence choice: (1) a rural system 
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still dominated by patrilocality, but with a noticeable rise in matrilocal 
residence and (2) an urban system with a strong preference for neolocal 
residence and indications of transient patrilocal and matrilocal 
arrangements. 
The theoretical basis for this study lies primarily in practice 
theory - which couples the motivations of actions with the complexities 
or strains of the situation (Ortner 2001). Cultural systems, like the 
social and economic systems in modem China, shape, guide, and even 
dictate behavior, such as where a couple chooses to reside after 
marriage (Ortner 2001). Changes in systems are, therefore, often 
reflected by changes in behavior. Scholars are aware of the affect of 
industrialization on family structures and customs (e.g. Pasternak 1968; 
Schnaiberg 1970; Sjoberg 1956). However, modernization alone 
cannot account for transformations in post-marital residence rules in 
China, nor can it duly explain the divergence of change from rural to 
urban areas. Ortner (2001) suggests that "change comes about when 
traditional strategies, which assume traditional patterns of relations, are 
deployed in relation to novel phenomena which do not respond to those 
strategies in traditional ways" (671). In China, the traditional strategy 
of patrilocality met with unprecedented social and economic reforms 
which prompted new strategies in post-marital residence. 
The changes in residence customs that took place in 20th 
century China, particularly within the last 25 years, had to contend with 
a strong precedent of patrilocality set by hundreds of years of political, 
religious, and cultural ideology. While modernization is often heralded 
as a major proponent of cultural change (thus implying that change is 
somehow inevitable), a host of institutions and ideas evolved in the 
People's Republic of China that radically changed the way Chinese 
individuals view the family structure and residence customs. Beyond 
advancements in technology and education, a series of extraordinary 
reforms were instituted following the Communist Party victory in 1949, 
through the Cultural Revolution of the 1960-70's, and after the death of 
communist leader Mao Zedong in 1976 that directly and indirectly 
altered the way Chinese families function. 
This paper reviews a collection of post-Mao literature that 
examines the relationship between social policies and changes in urban 
and rural Chinese family structure, in general, and post-marital 
residence, in particular. Many of the recent papers are based on first-
hand ethnographic studies conducted in China by Chinese and Western 
researchers, despite China's previous reluctance toward Western 
researchers. Several terms are used in these sources to describe 
residence rules. Patrilocal (or virilocal) residence is defined as 
customary residence with the husband's family after marriage where 
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children are added to the paternal line. Matrilocal (or uxorilocal) 
residence is the customary residence with the wife's family after 
marriage and children are added to the maternal line. And, neolocality 
refers to the post-marital residence pattern where a couple establishes a 
new place of residence rather than living with either set of parents. 
A Brie/History o/Post-Marital Residence Rules in China 
For several thousand years family structure and customs in China were 
dominated by Confucian ideology, which prescribed a natural order for 
families and a proper role for every member (Croll 1985; Ebrey 1993; 
Engel 1984). This organization stressed a son's obedience to his 
parents, the worship of patrilineal ancestors, and a wife's obligations to 
her husband's family. Female subordination was evident in the family 
structure. In her natal home, a woman obeys her father; after marriage, 
she serves her husband and is a perpetuator of his descent line; and 
after her husband's death, she obeys her son (Ebrey 1993; Han 2003). 
A Tradition 0/ Patrilocality 
Patrilocality was fundamental in maintammg the traditional 
Chinese family structure. Traditionally, upon marriage, a daughter 
moves from her natal home into her husband's home - or more 
accurately her husband's parents' home. In this customary system, the 
father-son relationship is paramount and daughter-in-laws have the 
lowest status in the family (Tsui 1989). Patrilocality establishes a 
descent group of core males related by common male ancestors where 
wives are seen as outsiders (Pasternak et al. 1997). The strong 
preference for sons is obvious in a system of patrilocality and 
patrilineal descent where "sons perpetuate the patriline" and "daughters 
produce offspring for other families" (Han 2003). Wealth was passed 
down to sons through inheritance and to daughters in the form of a 
dowry upon marriage (Ebrey 1993; Goody 1976). In this system 
women achieve economic security and social status through marriage. 
Until the 1930's large extended families were typical in both 
urban and rural China with several generations living in the same home 
(Tsui 1989). Typically, rural families had more children than families 
in urban areas. This trend continues today where at least 80 percent of 
contemporary Chinese people live and work in rural agricultural 
provinces (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Historically, Chinese families 
showed a greater preference for sons because sons "join the family 
labor force (daughters marry out), continue the patrilineage, and 
provide their parents with old age security" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 
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1987). Every Chinese man was encouraged to have many sons to fulfill 
these familial obligations (Croll 1985). As parents relied solely on 
their sons to provide for them as they grew old, patrilocality 
strengthened gender differences in traditional China. This gender 
inequality proved to be a major barrier to change in residence customs 
over time. 
The Matrilocal Alternative in Traditional China 
Although patrilocality was dominant in traditional rural and 
urban China, a number of researchers cite matrilocality as an alternative 
form of residence that took place under specific conditions (e.g. Goody 
1976; Han 2003; Li et al. 2000; Wolf 1985). Matrilocal residence 
occurred historically for two reasons: preservative or practical (Han 
2003). When a family had no son, a son-in-law was called in for a 
daughter in order to preserve the family line. In this case, either the 
son-in-law or one of the grandsons would adopt the family surname (Li 
et al. 2000). Matrilocal residence also occurs when, for practical 
reasons, families with few sons require additional male labor (Han 
2003). Families that marry sons out matrilocally generally had too 
many sons and too little land for inheritance (Pasternak et al. 1997). 
References to the historic practice of matrilocal marriage frequently 
note the stigmas and high costs associated with this alternative and, 
thus, the reasons why patrilocality continued to dominate (discussed 
further in the last section of this paper). 
In pre-revolutionary China, the frequency of matrilocal 
marriages was dependent on time and regional circumstance. 
Patrilocality remained the dominant form of post-marital residence 
according to political and religious customs for most of China's long 
history. Following years of civil war in the early 20th century, the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 brought about 
almost immediate mandates for change in marriage practices and 
family structures. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, social and 
economic reforms were enacted that had important consequences on the 
dominance of patrilocality in Chinese families. After the death of the 
communist leader and the end of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970's, 
a new series of reforms were instituted. These post-Mao policies had 
some of the strongest effects on Chinese family structure and post-
marital residence rules in both urban and rural areas. 
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Deconstructing Family Systems through Social Reforms 
Since the creation of a classless socialist society in China was the 
primary focus of communism, the "success of the socialist revolution in 
China depends upon revolutionary change in the Chinese family" 
(Engel 1984). The destruction of imperial stratification greatly 
depended on the new government's ability to shift wealth and power 
from patrilineal families into the hands of the collective people. 
Revolutionizing the Chinese family involved, first, the destruction of 
"the feudal marriage system" and, then, the reconstruction of a "new 
Democratic marriage system" (Croll 1981: 1). Patrilineage and 
patrilocal residence stood in direct opposition to communist ideals of 
economic and gender equality. 
The Introduction of Marriage Laws in China 
Immediately following the Communist Revolution, the new 
Chinese government developed certain policies that specifically 
targeted family structures and marriage customs. Enacted in 1950, the 
Marriage Law was a bold move against the patriarchal family system 
and a concerted effort to create greater gender equality by giving 
women more economic autonomy and political independence (Croll 
1983; Engel 1984). Some key aspects of the new policy were the 
abolishment of arranged marriages, concubinage, and polygyny (Davis 
& Harrell 1993). These reforms also gave women greater access to 
divorce and inheritance and attempted to reshape the family unit in a 
way that was more in line with national economic and social goals 
(Palmer 1995). 
Early government efforts to alter marriage customs and family 
structure were often ineffectual and new policies were adopted in a 
continuous process of achieving national goals. Following the death of 
Mao Zedong, the successive leadership introduced a new set of family 
laws in the late 1970's and early 1980's that strengthened previous 
reforms and promoted new agendas like population reduction and 
gender equality (Engel 1984; Palmer 1995). The 1980 marriage law 
specifically addressed post-marital residence rules and included an 
alternative to patrilocality: "Article 8. After a marriage has been 
registered, the woman may become a member of the man's family, or 
the man may become a member of the woman's family, according to 
the agreed wishes of the two parties" (Engel 1984). The law was a clear 
effort to elevate the status of daughters in a family by giving them the 
opportunity to remain in their natal homes after marriage and support 
their parents in their old age. Even now, evidence of these goals can be 
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found throughout the country on large billboards as part of a national 
publicity campaign to promote fewer children and raise the status of 
girls. One recent article includes a picture of a billboard which reads, 
"There's no difference between having a girl or a boy - girls can also 
continue the family line" (Hesketh et al. 2005). 
China's One-Child Family Policy 
The post-Mao effort to limit population began with unofficial 
restrictions on family size in the early 1970's; most notably, the 
"largely voluntary 'late, long, and few' policy, which called for later 
childbearing, greater spacing between children, and fewer children" 
(Hesketh et al. 2005). In 1979, these reproductive restrictions became a 
mandatory national policy known as the one-child family policy. This 
government reform garnered international criticism for strict control of 
reproductive rights and has been accused of promoting sex-selective 
abortions, female infanticide, and forced sterilizations. While the 
policy is a drastic measure to implement "small-family culture", the 
enforcement of the one-child rule varies considerably especially from 
rural to urban areas (Hesketh et al. 2005). Compliance to and 
exceptions from the one-child rule are decided primarily by local 
officials, which creates ambiguity in the policy goals. However, certain 
general factors are important to understanding the relationship between 
the one-child policy and urban versus rural residence customs: (1) the 
policy is strictly enforced for urban residents, with few exceptions; (2) 
in rural areas, a second child is often permitted after five years if the 
first child is a girl; (3) in remote, less populated areas and rural areas 
with labor shortages, second children are permitted; and (4) a second 
child is permitted for rural couples where the husband has settled in the 
home of his wife's parents (i.e. matrilocal residence) (Croll 1985; 
Davin 1985; Hesketh et al. 2005). Different applications of the one-
child policy from rural to urban areas yield different outcomes in 
family sizes and composition. 
Rural and Urban Demographics under the One-Child Policy 
Now, a generation after the one-child policy was instituted, the 
diverging demography of rural and urban populations is evident. New 
research documents these results and can offer some clues to a parallel 
divergence in post-marital residence rules. The "demographic 
determinist" view is one theory used to explain changes in family 
structure and shifts away from patrilocality, where "smaller families 
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mean that there will be fewer brothers available to live with a surviving 
parent" (Lavely & Ren 1992). 
Results of the 2001 National Planning and Reproductive 
Health Survey show an expected decrease in China's population, but 
also noticeably different rural to urban demographic outcomes. 
Largely due to the voluntary policy enacted from 1970 to 1979, the 
total fertility rate (the mean number of children born per woman) in 
China dropped from 5.9 to 2.9. From 1979, the year the one-child 
policy went into effect, a subsequent decline in fertility followed - from 
2.9 to 1.7 in 2004. Since the one-child restriction is more lenient in 
rural areas, the 2004 total fertility rate shows regional variation "with a 
rate of 1.3 in urban areas and just under 2.0 in rural areas" (Hesketh et 
al. 2005). The data reveal a "distinct demographic pattern of urban 
families with predominantly one child and rural families with 
predominantly two children" (2005). 
An assessment of the sex ratio at birth (the proportion of male 
live births to female live births) also shows regional variation from 
urban to rural areas in China. The data illustrate an overall increase in 
male to female births from 1.06 in 1979, to 1.11 in 1988, to 1.17 in 
2001. These fmdings also demonstrate that sex ratios vary locally and 
by birth order. The sex ratio is higher for a first child born in urban 
areas (1.13) than in rural areas (1.05), see Table 1. The ratio climbs 
even further for second order children, with 1.30 in urban areas and 
1.23 in rural areas (Hesketh et al. 2005). 
Birth Order In Urban In Rural Overall Areas Areas 
First child 1.13 1.05 1.06 
Second child 1.30 1.23 1.24 
Third child 1.19 1.29 1.28 
Fourth child or more 1.19 1.32 1.31 
Average of all birth 1.16 1.15 1.15 
orders 
Table 1. Ratio of Men to Women According to Birth Order in China, 
1980 to 2001 (Hesketh et al. 2005) 
Several factors could account for these figures: (1) stricter 
adherence to the one child rule in urban areas and a strong preference 
for sons overall would increase sex-selective abortions with the first 
pregnancy in urban areas and with the second and subsequent 
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pregnancies in rural areas, (2) non-registration of female births, and (3), 
very rarely, female infanticide and less aggressive medical treatment of 
sick female infants (Hesketh et al. 2005). However, the distorted sex 
ratio is not attributed solely to the one-child policy and researchers 
indicate that a high sex ratio occurred prior to the Communist 
Revolution in 1949. 
Parents who believe that only a son will provide for them in 
their old age tend not to support or cooperate with the new one-child-
per-family ideal and fertility control efforts, especially when they 
already have one child who is a daughter. To the extent that patrilocal 
residence customs continue to be practiced in contemporary China, 
parents will want sons as old age insurance and consider daughters of 
less value, and parents continue having children until they have a son or 
enough sons to provide for them in their old age (Enge11984). 
Long-standing cultural preferences for male heirs compete 
strongly with populations controls and are tied directly to patrilocality. 
In an effort to further understand the discernable differences in 
demography from urban to rural areas, government incentives to follow 
the one-child policy also provide some answers. 
Incentives and Disincentives of Social Reforms 
The family-planning strategy outlined by the one-child policy 
relies not only on political persuasion and voluntary compliance, but on 
a system of economic rewards and sanctions (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 
1987). Economic benefits to families with only-children include 
housing priorities, wage bonuses, extra work points, and additional 
maternity leave for mothers who pledge to have one child. Only 
children are entitled to free medical care, priority in nursery, school, 
and university enrollment, and priority in employment placement after 
graduation (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Parents of an only-child are 
entitled to a form of social security upon retirement (Croll 1985). 
Researchers note, however, that many of these incentives 
"hold little appeal for rural families" and, thus, the incentives "have 
been more effective" for urban families (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). 
Wage bonuses, work points, and maternity leave have little value to 
men and women working in rural areas on family farms. Housing 
priorities only apply to city dwellers where space is limited. And, free 
health care is often the only benefit that many rural children can take 
advantage of (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Because these incentives 
have failed to convince many rural families to limit family size, fertility 
rates appear consistently higher in rural areas. Local officials have 
resorted to more convincing incentives to limit rural populations. 
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Additional grain allotments, increased family plots, and job placement 
in industries are examples of more recent offerings to rural, one-child 
families (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). 
Punishments for not complying with the one-child rule can be 
severe and disproportionately affect rural families. These disincentives 
include "reductions in state grain allotments for second and third 
children, expropriation of family goods (such as television sets, 
bicycles, or sewing machines), taxes on overquota births, or 
reassignment to less fertile plots" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). 
Interviews with family-planning program managers, however, suggest 
that these penalties hold little sway with rural farmers whose labor 
source is their offspring. One such administrator "conceded that many 
peasant families in South China believe the potential labor productivity 
of sons can ultimately offset economic disincentives imposed by the 
government" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). 
Since the adoption and enforcement of reproductive 
restrictions, however, the proportion of no-son families in rural China 
has increased as a result of sustained low fertility (Li et al. 2003). 
These limits to family size are in direct opposition to the patrilineal, 
extended family model long-held as the ideal traditional family. The 
traditional model continues to shape beliefs about family structure and 
residence rules in contemporary rural China: "for many people, 
especially the older generation, a large multi generational household is 
still regarded as an ideal, as it symbolizes wealth, harmony between 
family members, and the filial piety of the young for the old" (Tsui 
1989). 
Social policies and specifically the one-child rule offer some 
clues to post-marital residence choices in contemporary China. The 
demographic results of these policies indicate modem patterns of urban 
families with one child and a strong son preference and rural families 
with two children and a similar preference for sons. Patrilocality and 
the distorted sex-ratio seem to present a reciprocal relationship. When 
sons remain at home after marriage and take care of their aging parents, 
son preference persists and families with only sons or many sons trend 
toward patrilocality. However, fewer children and fewer sons, in 
particular, begin to alter family decisions on residence. Alternatives 
that were once discounted as inferior now become viable options. 
Government policies have attempted to disrupt the son-
preference/patrilocal pattern by sanctioning matrilocal residence and 
promoting the ability of daughters to maintain family lineage and 
provide for their parents. 
Fertility and high-sex ratios alone cannot fully explain why a 
rural or urban family decides to deviate from the patrilocal tradition. 
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Economic policies that came about at the same time as social refonns 
did not specifically target marriage or family structure, but contributed 
to changes in residence practices in rural and urban China over time. 
The Influence of Agricultural and Economic Reforms 
The Communist Revolution in China brought about a number of 
changes in access to economic resources and how people earn a living. 
This reorganization, like social refonns, impacted family structures and 
customs. The new refonns were based on the "unselfish, collectivist 
orientation emphasized by the Communist Party" and were in direct 
contrast to "traditional familism, which calls for self-sacrifice for 
parents and ancestors" (Tsui 1989). Economic factors that 
predominantly affect decisions of post-marital residence in rural and 
urban areas are individuals' access to employment, the issue of old age 
security, and the distribution of wealth within family units. 
Economic Opportunities and Organization 
Urban families differ from rural families in economic 
organization in contemporary China and this affects residence patterns 
after marriage (Wolf 1985). Married sons and daughters have different 
access to employment in rural and urban areas and ideas about wealth 
are shaped by government policies. Early communist refonns and 
economic development strategies, such as the Great Leap Forward 
(1958 to 1960) pushed gender equality in the workforce and 
subsequently saw a great number of women entering rural and urban 
labor roles for the first time (Croll 1983; Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). 
In rural areas, ideas of gender equality fell short as men were 
promoted to higher paying jobs in dam building, irrigation, and 
reforestation - leaving field work to rural women (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 
1987). Patriarchal systems were maintained even with the adoption of 
agricultural communes. Women became workers in the field, in 
addition to the home, and men were agricultural supervisors and heads 
of households. Since males had greater access to and control over 
economic and agricultural resources, preferences for sons continued 
and patrilocality continued. 
In the mid- 1970's, as government planners were reassessing 
population controls they adopted new agricultural policies with the goal 
of increasing rural productivity. The new policies dissolved collective 
fanns and restored agricultural production to the pre-revolutionary 
family unit (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987; Lavely & Ren 1992). Under 
the new "family responsibility system", communally owned fanns were 
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divided into family owned plots for cultivation. Production quotas 
allowed families to keep surpluses and instituted penalties for 
shortages. A subsequent increase in agricultural production meant that 
families could afford more children and more offspring, in turn, would 
provide more labor. The restoration of family farming units, therefore, 
seemed to be in direct opposition to social policies that limit the 
number of children in the family (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). 
While the return to the traditional family· economic 
organization reinforced patrilocal and patrilineal systems in the 
countryside, many rural women were given new employment 
alternatives through another economic policy. Coinciding with the 
dissolution of collective farms, the government promoted additional 
strategies to increase "domestic sideline production" in rural 
households (Croll 1983: 30). These sideline activities were targeted for 
export and included animal husbandry, cultivation of fruits and wild 
plants, handicraft industries like lace making, basket weaving, sewing, 
and knitting (Croll 1983; Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Many of the 
production activities were undertaken by female members of rural 
households and the economic opportunities resulted in a marked 
increase in household income (Croll 1983). With greater economic 
opportunities in rural areas, the potential to change traditional family 
customs increased. Lavely and Ren (1992) found that, while 
agricultural reforms in rural Taiwan increased extended families, new 
family structures arose where family labor was divided between 
agriculture and industry. They say, "this new version of the complex 
household is a far more co-operative and egalitarian organization than 
the traditional patriarchal grand family" (Lavely & Ren 1992). New 
economic organization in rural Chinese families opened the door for 
new patterns of post-marital residence. 
Revolutionary and post-Mao economic reforms created 
different employment opportunities in urban areas. Since the 
establishment of communism, China's urban economy was dominated 
by "small street or neighbourhood factories which are based on low 
capital investment, are labour intensive and are collectively owned by 
the workers" (Croll 1983: 47). The influx of women into the urban 
labor force provided the fIrst opportunities for many women to gain 
employment outside of their homes. Education opportunities were 
greater for girls in urban areas and allowed many women to acquire 
production and service roles traditionally held by men. More recently 
urban individuals have been encouraged by the government to establish 
private enterprises in manufacturing and providing services (Croll 
1983). This entrepreneurial motivation has translated into a new sense 
of economic independence for younger men and women. In an 
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examination of Chinese urban family structure, Tsui (1989) found "an 
increasingly individualistic attitude toward life has developed among 
young people" which is evident in "a growing interest in material 
comfort and individual conjugal units." Tsui's observations clearly 
convey how economic transformations in urban areas foster a shift 
toward neolocal residence patterns. 
Old Age Security as a Factor in Post-Marital Residence Rules 
Traditionally and today, a primary economic concern for both 
urban and rural families in China and a strong motivation for 
patrilocality is the issue of old age security. Although the government 
has repeatedly attempted to address the issue, economic planners have 
yet to devise an effective system: 
In 1980, only 19 percent of the total work force was eligible for 
retirement benefits; in the countryside, less than half a million out of a 
total rural population of 800 million were receiving pensions in 1981. 
Unless adequate old-age security is universally provided, the elderly in 
China will remain dependent on their children for financial and social 
support. Even though the welfare system, Five Guarantees (food, 
clothing, shelter, child care, and burial), is available in rural areas for 
retirees who have no close relatives, the system is not regarded as a 
desirable alternative because the economic support is minimal and the 
loss of face is great. (Hong 1987) 
This critical concern for old age security reinforces patrilocality and 
reliance on sons for economic support, especially in rural areas. 
Although patrilocality still dominates, the increasing trend of matrilocal 
marriages in rural China may indicate a growing reliance on daughters 
for old age security rather than acceptance of government welfare. A 
key government decree that supports this trend was the move to give 
daughters equal rights of inheritance. Where, historically, daughters 
had no rights to family property or wealth and dowries were often only 
symbolic, this reform gave rural and urban daughters more power 
within and outside of the family unit (Watson & Ebrey 1991). 
Wealth Distribution within Rural and Urban Families 
In many rural families, male heads of households sign 
contracts for agricultural plots and control family wealth (Dalsimer & 
Nisonoff 1987). Even the sideline activities of women that contribute 
to household income are regulated by men. Within these families, 
33 
parents invest in their children so that they are taken care of in old age. 
The economic productivity of younger individuals, married or not, 
helps support elderly relatives who have limited means of generating 
personal income in rural areas, but contribute to family welfare through 
activities such as childcare. Social reforms that limit family size are 
seen as threats to the economic security of older Chinese who rely on 
their children and grandchildren. In spite of increases in agricultural 
production, strict family planning laws weaken the system of extended 
families and can reduce the patrilineal network to direct lineal kin 
(Hong 1987). The one-child policy creates a "1-2-4" family structure 
where, before marriage, a single child may be economically supporting 
two parents and four grandparents. Under these circumstances, 
neolocal residence, either before or after marriage, is a rare option in 
rural areas. 
Place of Residence Percentage 
Neolocal 48.33 (2,414) 
Patrilocal 40.02 (2,003) 
Matrilocal 9.69 (485) 
Other 2.06 (103) 
Total 100 (5,005) 
Table 2. Place of Residence Right After Marriage (Tsui 1989: 745) 
Reproduction restrictions do not pose the same problems of 
old age security in cities where "the economic dependence of the parent 
on the child has been gradually diminishing in urban China" (Tsui 
1989). The Five-City Survey conducted in 1982 examined family 
structures in the five largest cities in China. The results "showed that 
50% of urban people aged 60 to 80 were either gainfully employed or 
receiving a retirement pension" (Tsui 1989). In urban areas, seniority 
and longevity in wage distribution create intergenerational differences 
in wealth and contribute to fmancial dependence of the young on the 
old (Tsui 1989). With strict enforcement of the one-child rule in cities, 
the 1-2-4 system is creating an urban culture of "little emperors" and 
"little empresses". Tsui (1989) reports that young married couples 
often live with their parents (patrilocally or matrilocally) for a period of 
time or live in their own residence (neolocally) and receive financial 
support from their parents. With specific regard to post-marital 
residence, the survey data show a steady increase in matrilocality since 
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the 1940's and a dramatic shift toward neolocal residence in 
contemporary urban China, see Table 2 (Tsui 1989). 
Furthermore, several researchers indicate that, while 
patrilocality is still common (and dominant) in many urban areas, its 
persistence as a long-term residence strategy is much more in question. 
Lavely and Ren (1992) address this issue: "the substantial decline in the 
length of co-residence indicates that patrilocal marriage may be on its 
way to becoming a ritual interlude rather than a long-term 
commitment." It is common practice for couples to receive free room 
and board in their parents' house after marriage, but this situation is 
"likely to be temporary if we consider the growing aspiration for 
privacy among the young in urban China" (Tsui 1989). This form of 
transient residence would not be limited to patrilocality. In an 
increasing number of cases, urban couples are deciding to live with the 
wife's parents, matrilocally, even for a short period of time for 
economic considerations (Tsui 1989). 
Constraints to Change in Post-marital Residence Rules 
Economic dependence and independence are strong motivators for 
deciding to reside matrilocally or neolocally. As factors like these 
encourage change from traditional residence rules, other factors can be 
powerful constraints. Marriage customs like residence rules do not 
exist as isolated entities, but depend on a complex cultural system to 
constantly reinforce and maintain their function in a society. When 
examined from a demographic or economic perspective, practicality 
seems to dictate an easy transition from traditional customs. However, 
following hundreds of years of traditional residence practices 
throughout China, a number of beliefs have evolved that preserve the 
patrilocal, patrilineal family system. 
Female Sexuality and Sex Taboos 
One of the strongest obstacles to change in traditional post-
marital residence is overcoming long held beliefs about female 
sexuality and family dynamics. Taboos on sexuality and reproduction 
uphold patriarchal family structures and seem to be more dominant in 
rural areas. In rural north China, Han (2003) examined a cultural taboo 
referred to locally as Bufafang - which forbids women to have sexual 
intercourse in their natal home. Bufafang is described as a belief that, 
"from the parents' point of view, a daughter's (married or not) 
sexuality in the natal home brings bad luck to sons, especially to those 
sons who live together with the parents" (Han 2003). 
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The sex taboo is often less about female sexual purity and 
more about propriety in where to have sex and the importance of 
maintaining male dominated households. If an unmarried daughter has 
sex with her boyfriend in her natal home it is considered Bufafang, but 
if that same act takes place in the boyfriend's home, the sex taboo does 
not apply, even though premarital sex is strongly discouraged (Han 
2003). This taboo extends to daughters after marriage and parents are 
vigilant in heeding off bad luck for their sons. 
Other taboos related to childbirth also reinforce patrilocal 
post-marital residence. In many farming communities, the cultural idea 
persists that women should not deliver babies in their natal homes (Han 
2003). The practice of confinement after childbirth also restricts a 
woman to her husband's home. Since the child is part of her husband's 
patriline and not the responsibility of her natal home, breaking these 
taboos are believed to bring harm to her natal home (Han 2003). The 
persistence of these taboos and cultural beliefs, predominantly in rural 
areas, prove to be powerful constraints to may Chinese families III 
deviating from patrilocality. 
The Stigma of Matrilocal Marriage 
In addition to specific local taboos about post-marital 
residence, the widespread view of matrilocal marriage as inferior and 
secondary endures in contemporary China and can prevent its increase 
as an alternative to patrilocality. Wolf (1985) found that in traditional 
south China "a man contemplating an uxorilocal marriage for a 
daughter had to get permission from his brothers and from his lineage, 
and both were prone to say no" (199). Families were reluctant to see 
wealth, property, and power passed out of direct descent. Matrilocal 
marriages were considered secondary choices under disgraceful 
circumstances and families involved lost a measure of respect in their 
communities (Han 2003). The difficulties in arranging and residing in 
a matrilocal marriage extended beyond the family unit to the son-in-
law. The called-in son-in-law suffered serious criticism and was often 
considered inferior to other married men, in spite of the fact that most 
marriages at the time were arranged and completely out of his hands 
(Han 2003; Pasternak et al. 1997). 
Even as family structures and compositions are changed by 
social and economic forces, patrilocality remains "overwhelmingly 
dominant in contemporary rural China" (Li et al. 2003). Matrilocal 
residence still carries high stigmas for families and long-standing 
patterns of patrilineage are difficult to change. Wolf (1985) explains 
the continued preference for patrilocality: 
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The reasons rural women prefer to live with their sons are quite simple. 
Only women who have failed to produce sons live with their daughters, 
and they are considered to be living on charity (unless, as only rarely 
happens, their daughter married-in a husband). Even a woman who 
despises her daughter-in-law and has little affection for her son will still 
live with them rather than a beloved daughter. A daughter's house is 
someone else's house and a daughter belongs to someone else's family. 
(223) 
Son preference is equal, ifnot stronger, in urban families who are more 
restricted to the one-child rule, as evident in the higher sex-ratios, see 
Table 1. However, matrilocal residence is higher in urban areas and 
seems to carry fewer stigmas (Lavely & Ren 1992; Tsui 1989). 
Urban Constraints to Change in Post-Marital Residence Rules 
In large cities, certain traditions coupled with environmental 
conditions promote patrilocality. Urban children that take care of their 
parents according to traditional custom are expected to live at the 
latter's house (Tsui 1989). Often in urban China, a child takes over a 
parent's job after the parent retires and, in many cases, they "have to 
live with the parents because they usually cannot get a room 
assignment while their parents live in a company house" (Tsui 1989). 
So, even where individuals have their own income, neolocality can be 
prevented by shear lack of housing. This constraint to residence 
change in urban areas appears to be more a consequence of 
industrialization and less a product of tradition. 
Conclusion 
In rural China today, patrilocality remains the dominant form 
of post-marital residence. In many rural provinces, studies suggest that 
"the chances that a bride will reside with her husband's parents ... after 
marriage has remained stable or even risen since 1950" (Lavely & Ren 
1992). However, the pressures of social and economic reform are 
becoming evident in post-marital residence choices. A rise in 
matrilocality in rural areas indicates a shift in residence customs to deal 
with low family sizes and high sex ratios. 
While constraints to the practice of matrilocality are seen more 
in rural areas, recent research shows that the power of sex taboos in 
many of these local regions is weakening. Han's (2003) research of 
Bufafang in rural north China demonstrates this change: "in all cases of 
concern about Bufafang, the daughters/sisters seemed unaware of 
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Bufafang and its potential danger, suggesting that Bufafang may be 
fading away among the younger generation." As taboos and beliefs 
that enforce patrilocal residence lessen, rural families with few sons or 
only daughters may decide to live matrilocally to continue the family 
line and ensure old age security. The increasing necessity of 
alternatives to patrilocality indicates a change that is more often 
contingent and based on individual family circumstances and not a 
general institutional trend toward matrilocal residence (Li et al. 2003). 
Changes in post-marital residence in urban China during the 
same time period involve equally complicated determinants and 
motivations. Notions of modernization, westernization, and 
industrialization offer only simple explanations to the rise of neolocal 
residence in cities and do not address the complexity of factors that 
have contributed to this change over the last century (Pasternak 1968). 
Greater access to personal income and higher education coupled with 
lower fertility have created an urban culture of only children who prefer 
to live on their own or only briefly with their parents after marriage. 
The post-marital residence decision in urban China is not so 
easily equated with other industrialized nations, however. Despite the 
country's rapid globalization of a number of its institutions, many 
family customs and practices remain, in an etic perspective, entrenched 
in tradition. In contemporary China, the strong pressure to marry is 
tied to the belief that Chinese young people do not achieve adult status 
until marriage. Those that stay single can be forced into "crowded, 
same-sex dormitories maintained for young unmarrieds at some 
worksites" (Dalsimer & Nisonoff 1987). Considering this scenario, 
residence choice should be considered not only as a practice post-
marriage, but as an influence on the decision to marry at all. Future 
research in this area should take advantage of China's increasing move 
out of isolationism and incorporate growing access to the Chinese 
perspectives on changes within their own culture. 
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